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Defense literature is still in need of a theoretical framework in the neoclassical sense, 
in  regard  to  empirical  research  on  the  relationship  between  defense  spending  and 
economic growth. In this respect, Dunne, Smith and Willenbockel (2005), although 
not without technical problems, represented a breakthrough in the field. In addition, 
the whole empirical literature following Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) is based on 
the unrealistic assumption that technological progress is identical across countries and 
constant  in  time.  Recently,  Bayraktar-Saglam  and  Yetkiner  (2012)  developed  a 
theoretical  framework  that  overcomes  the  unrealistic  assumption  of  constant  and 
identical rates of technological progress. In this paper, we achieve two things. First, 
we develop the true growth-defense model, based on Dunne, Smith and Willenbockel 
(2005).  Second,  we  overcome  the  general  weakness  of  constant  and  identical 
technological  progress  assumption  in  empirical  growth  studies  by  employing 
Bayraktar-Saglam and Yetkiner (2012) growth framework. We show that the intensity 
of defense spending in GDP has both positive and negative effects. In this respect, the 
theory  supports  the  findings  of  the  empirical  literature,  which  are  inconclusive  in 
nature. 
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1  Introduction 
 
In his recent work, Dunne (2010:2) states that “developing a theoretical model 
is important for any empirical study, but much of economic theory does not 
have an explicit role for military spending as a distinctive economic activity”. 
He continues by saying “in empirical work, the fact that there is no agreed 
theory of growth among economists means that there is no standard framework 
that military spending can be fitted into”. We agree with Dunne’s observation, 
and  find  the  lack  of  focus  on  economic  growth-military  spending  nexus 
surprising, for at least two main reasons. First, military expenditure has always 
been an important issue among economists and has always been perceived as a 
significant item in total GDP (=aggregate expenditure), although its share may 
have  fallen  in  comparison  to  education  or  health  expenditures  for  some 
countries. Hence, it is disappointing to find that the link between such a central 
issue and economic growth has not been sufficiently developed. Second, the 
(modern)  growth  literature  has  a  long  history  since  Solow  (1956),  with  a 
second  golden  age  in  1990s  and  2000s  after  Romer  (1986),  Lucas  (1988), 
Barro (1990) and Romer (1990). During this period, although many growth-
related  issues  were  thoroughly  explored  at  the  theoretical  level  by  growth 
economists, it is surprising to note that the defense-related aspects of the theory 
did not develop to a satisfactory level. 
 
The argument that there is no solid theory in the neoclassical sense on growth-
defense nexus does not mean a total absence of work in that direction. Indeed, 
Dunne,  Smith  and  Willenbockel  (2005),  henceforth  DSW  (2005),  was  a 
historical breakthrough, as it offered a neoclassical framework for empirical 
research in growth-defense nexus by adopting the convergence framework of 
the economic growth setup. However, the proposed framework had its own 
technical problems. In particular, we note five areas of inconsistency. First and 
foremost, the model is ‘unclosed’ in the sense that an item called “share of 
military expenditure in GDP” appears in the final good production function (as 
an externality), with no indication of who makes this expenditure or how it is 
financed. In this respect, the item is a “manna from heaven”, which is against 
the  general  equilibrium  understanding.  The  second  inconsistency  results 
directly  from  the  first:  DSW  (2005)  assume  that  the  “share  of  military 
expenditure in GDP” is function of time, without further specification, that is, 
leaving the “share of military expenditure in GDP” in generic form (undefined) 
in the model. This fact indeed makes it impossible to make the derivations that 
DSW (2005) did, or to draw any firm conclusion. However, DSW (2005) did 
just this, arguing, for example that the “share of military expenditure in GDP” 4 
 
does not affect the steady state results. As we will show in an unambiguous 
way in the next section, this particular argument is not valid unless the growth 
rate of the “share of military expenditure in GDP” is zero in the steady state 
(normally, a share variable is always zero in the steady state; in DSW (2005), 
however, it is impossible to derive this result as the variable is left undefined 
and generic).
1 The third controversial finding is the derivation of convergence 
equation in DSW (2005), which, given that the “share of military expenditure 
in GDP” is function of time, cannot be correct. Indeed, they had to define the 
specific behavior of the “share of military expenditure in GDP” in time in the 
model, which would require linearization of two equations of motion through a 
truncated  Taylor’s  expansion.  Fourth,  the  way  DSW  (2005)  introduce  the 
“share of military expenditure in GDP” to the technology variable may not 
work in the exact way expected by DSW (2005), because a share parameter is 
between zero and one, and so, the share of military expenditure does indeed 
level down the technology. In that respect, it does have a ‘negative’ impact on 
technology. Finally, there are some other minor derivational errors that need to 
be corrected. All in all, DSW (2005) is a great advance towards a complete 
growth-defense  framework  for  empirical  purposes,  but  abovementioned 
inconsistencies create a serious weakness in the model and have to be removed. 
 
Even though a solid theory on growth-defense nexus was lacking, dozens of 
empirical works have been produced studying the impact of military spending 
on economic growth.
2 However, as well as an  absence of a widely-accepted 
theoretical background for all these empirical growth-defense studies, another 
critical  drawback,  which  originates  from  initial  works  of  the  empirical 
economic growth literature,  was  undermining all these empirical works on 
growth-defense nexus. Recall that two interrelated empirical research strands 
have  emerged  from  the  neoclassical  growth  theory.  The  first  strand  of 
                                                       
1 Even if this assumption were correct, we could not make that particular argument. Recall that 
in  standard  convergence  derivations  macro  variables  are  transformed  into  immeasurable 
variables, e.g., capital per efficient capita, for analytical tractability. The same is done in DSW 
(2005). However, these variables must be transformed back to measurable ones, e.g., capital 
per capita, to make sensible conclusions. The same applies DSW (2005). It is indeed easy to 
see  that  GDP  per  capita  and  capital  per  capita  are  a  function  of  the  “share  of  military 
expenditure in GDP”. 
2 Research on the relationship between defense spending on economic growth started with the 
seminal studies of Benoit (1973, 1978). There have been a few studies attempting to set up  a 
solid theoretical linkage between defense spending and economic growth in neoclassical sense. 
For example, Feder (1982), Ram (1986) and Biswas and Ram (1986) considered dynamic  real 
effects of exogenous military expenditure on output (DSW (2005) showed that that particular 
framework contains bugs). Aizenman and Glick (2006), Mylonidis (2008) and Pieroni (2009) 
exploited the Barro (1990) model. Knight et al. (1996) used the augmented Solow model in the 
sense  of  MRW  (1992).  Atesoglou  (2002)  and  Halicioglu  (2004)  adopted  the  new 
macroeconomic model of Romer (2000) and Taylor (2000). See Chan (1985), Ram (1995), 5 
 
empirical studies aimed to determine the sources of international differences in 
income per capita.  The  second investigated whether  low-income economies 
grow faster than the high-income ones due to diminishing marginal returns, as 
the neoclassical growth theory conjectures. This area of investigation quickly 
became dubbed convergence analysis. An intensive period of research began, 
especially  after  Mankiw,  Romer  and  Weil  (1992),  which  became  the  basic 
empirical  framework  to  test  for  convergence.
3  MRW (1992)  estimated  an 
augmented Solow model, which includes human capital  stock in addition to 
physical capital stock. This model reveals that income per capita is determined 
by population growth, accumulation of physical  capital and of human capital. 
Within this set up, they f ind strong evidence for  (conditional) convergence: 
countries with similar technologies and rates of  physical and human capital 
accumulation converge in income per capita. Given the Solovian set up , and 
the fact  that technology is exogenous, it was natural for MRW (1992) to 
assume that the growth rate of technology does not vary across countries (in 
particular, it was taken as 0.02). Subsequently, following MRW (1992), most 
empirical studies on  the convergence issue or on the sources of international 
differences in income per capita  not only treated technology as an exogenous 
component but, in addition, considered it  merely a component in the constant 
term  in  econometric  sense.
4  Many  convergence  studies  estimated  the 
convergence rate in the range 0.02 to 0.10.
5 These studies used such equations 
that convergence takes place through the adjustment of the capital output ratio 
instead of changes in technology or its determinants. We believe as a result of 
this stance, a large body of empirical studies on conditional convergence  has 
overemphasized  the  role  of  capital  accumulation  and ,  correspondingly, 
underestimated the role of technological change.
6 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Dunne  (1996),  Smith  (2000),  Dunne  and  Uye  (2009)  for  detailed  surveys  on  empirical 
evidence on the defense-growth nexus. 
3 Henceforth, we will use MRW (1992) instead of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). 
4 Those convergence studies using panel data technique in their analysis, such as Islam (1995) 
and Caselli  et  al.  (1996)  overcome  this  problem  only  partially,  as  they  allow  for  using 
individual country effects to capture the technology differences across countries. However, 
these studies continue to assume constant growth rate of technology for each country. 
5 E.g., Islam (1995), Caselli et al. (1996), Murthy and Chien (1997) Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992, 2003), Nonneman and Vanhoudt (1996), and Keller and Poutvaara (2005). 
6  This study is not alone in opposing the adoption of constant and non -varying rate of 
technological change across countries in convergence studies. Two good examples are Bloom 
et al. (2002) and Dowrick and Rogers (2002). The former objected to both the idea of identical 
rate of technological progress in every country and the fixed effects approach adopted by panel 
data versions (e.g., Islam (1995) and Caselli et al. (1996)), which allows for TFP differentials 
across countries but assume that these differentials persist indefinitely. The latter argued that 
the  growth  rate  of  technology  depends  on  the  technology  gap  between  the  leader  and  the 
follower.  6 
 
A recent study by Bayraktar-Saglam and Yetkiner (2012), henceforth BS&Y 
(2012),  argued  that  one  major  reason  why  the  convergence  literature 
persistently assumed constant and identical growth rate is that the Solovian 
framework  is  relatively  simple,  and  therefore  unable  to  differentiate 
technological  change  across  economies  under  the  exogenous  technological 
change assumption.  In this respect,  BS&Y (2012) argued  that the literature 
needs an augmented framework that allows the differentiation of economies in 
regard to the sources of economic  growth in  general, and on technological 
change in particular. Recall that the first-generation endogenous growth models 
have emphasized R&D activities as major force behind economic growth (cf., 
Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992)). 
Since the scale effect prediction of those models were not supported by the 
data  (cf.,  Jones  (1995)),  this  leads  to  the  emergence  of  second  generation 
endogenous growth or semi-endogenous growth models, which assume that the 
rate of technological progress in any particular country depends on its research 
intensity, that is, the proportion of labor force employed in the R&D sector and 
the  proportion  of  income  devoted  to  R&D  sector.
7  Hence, if the Solovian 
framework  of  convergence  analysis  is  going  to  be  augmented,  a  critical 
contribution would be to decompose exogenous technological change into its 
determinants, and then to introduce the  proportion of skilled labor into that 
component. 
 
To this end, BS&Y (2012) developed a framework that on the one hand allows 
the introduction of non-constant and non-identical technological growth rates, 
and on the other, retains the simplicity and appropriateness of the Solovian 
convergence equation.  In particular,  BS&Y (2012)  imposed  the exogenous 
allocation of consumption-saving tradeoff of Solow (1956) to the endogenous 
technological change model of Romer (1990) ,  and called  this  Solovianized 
Romer model. The framework allows for the elimination of the assumption of 
the constant technology parameter in MRW-like convergence equation, since 
the solution of the model reveals that technological progress depends on the 
characteristics of the R&D sector in general and the share of R&D personnel in 
the labor force in particular. More over, the theoretical framework  in which 
Solow (1956) meets Romer (1990) brings to forefront the role of human capital 
(in the final-good and R&D sectors) in convergence analysis in a more elegant 
                                                       
7 Examples to empirical applications of semi-endogenous growth models are Jones (2002), 
Kim (2008) and Kim (2011). In particular, Jones (2002) demonstrated that R&D intensity and 
educational attainment explain 80% of the US economic growth. Other studies in the same 
vein, such as Ha and Howitt (2007), Howitt (2000), Zachariadis (2004), Madsen (2008) and 
Ulku (2007) all underline that the rate of technological progress in one country depends on the 
research intensity in that country, which is, by and large, the fraction of labor force employed 
in the R&D sector and the fraction of income devoted to R&D sector. 7 
 
way (in particular, in BS&Y (2012), human capital is not treated simply as a 
duplicate  of  physical  capital,  as  has  been  the  usual  practice  since  MRW 
(1990)).  The  empirical  part  of  the  paper  estimates  the  Solovianized  Romer 
model for 31 OECD countries for the period 1980-2008, employing system 
GMM  approach.  The  findings  of  BS&Y  (2012),  which  runs  the  theoretical 
model in three different versions, can be summarized as follows: 
 
1.  All runs imply a convergence rate lower than that which is suggested by 
the literature. 
2.  The  investment  rate  has  a  positive  and  statistically  significant 
contribution to convergence in all runs. 
3.  R&D has positive and statistically significant impact on convergence in 
all runs regardless of the proxy BS&Y (2012) use. Both the share of 
labor and share of income devoted to R&D has positive and significant 
role on growth. 
4.  The role of human capital on convergence is positive in all runs, though 
it is statistically insignificant in some runs. 
 
This study expands that particular framework by adding the defense sector to 
the model in the sense of DSW (2005). A short summary of the model is as 
follows:  there  are  three  private  sectors,  namely  the  final  good  sector,  the 
intermediate-good sector, and R&D sector, in addition to a government. The 
role of government is to manage the defense sector, which hires a proportion of 
skilled labor in the sector, financed through income taxation of the final-good 
sector. The R&D sector generates new blueprints through skilled labor. We 
assume that the intensity of defense (which is the share of defense expenditure 
in  total  GDP  and  may  also  be  interpreted  as  the  income  tax  rate),  is  an 
externality in the knowledge production function of private sector. We consider 
this  a  legitimate  assumption,  as  in  practice,  the  defense  sector  positively 
enhances private R&D in many economies, at least in technology producing 
economies (a good example is the Internet). Blueprints of new knowledge are 
sold  in  the  market  through  auctions,  and  firms  purchased  them  to  produce 
intermediate goods in a monopolistically competitive market. The final good 
sector exploits all intermediates to produce the final good. As knowledge stock 
grows,  new  varieties  appear,  and  hence  final  output  grows.  Given  that  the 
saving-consumption  tradeoff  and  the  allocation  of  human  capital  among 
competing  sectors  are  exogenous,  we  derive  the  long  run  determinants  of 
economic growth and the convergence equation. This resembles the respective 
conventional equations, but allows for different technological growth rates at 
different times and for different countries. In addition to this, we introduce the 
role of defense spending in long run determinants and convergence equations 8 
 
in a general equilibrium framework. In this set up, the role of the defense sector 
is  not  necessarily  positive  or  negative.  The  externality  effect  of  defense 
spending on R&D sector is the positive effect. On the other hand, taxation and 
the allocation of some skilled labor to the defense sector have negative effects 
in the process of long run development. Therefore, the total (net) effect can be 
either negative or positive, depending on the nature of country or the period. 
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses inconsistencies 
in  the  well-established  DSW  (1995).  Section  3  presents  a  theoretical 
framework which develops a growth equation and a convergence equation for 
empirical use. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2  The DSW (2005) Framework 
 
In their study, DSW (2005) proposed an “augmented Solow model”, in which 
they  show  the  relationship  between  defense  and  growth.  In  particular,  they 
propose the following Cobb-Douglas production function: 
 
 
    
1 ) ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( t L t A t K t Y             (1) 
 
where  ) (t Y  denotes aggregate real income,  ) (t K  is the real capital stock,  ) (t L  
is labor, and the technology parameter  ) (t A  evolves according to:
8 
 
 )) ( ( ) ( 0 t m e A t A
gt                (2) 
 
where  g  is the exogenous rate of Harrod-neutral technical progress and  ) (t m  
is the share of military expenditure in GDP.
9 Next, DSW (2005) defined the 
physical  capital  accumulation  of  the  model  by  using  Solow’s  Fundamental 
Equation of Growth by assuming an exogenous saving rate  s , a constant labor 
force growth rate n, and a given rate of capital depreciation  .
10 In particular, 
they described the dynamics of capital accumulation as follows: 
 
                                                       
8 We would not call  ) (t A  a parameter but an exogenous variable. 
9 In DSW (2005),    is undefined (in their notation system it is   instead of  ; we reserve   
for  another  use  in  this  paper).  They  later  made  the  interpretation  that  “   represents  the 
elasticity  of  steady-state  income  with  respect  to  the  long-run  military  expenditure  share” 
(DSW,  2005,  p.  458).  However,  we  will  show  that  this  definition  may  not  be  correct. 
Furthermore, no hint has been made on the sign of   , though it plays a crucial role in the 
model. We presume that it is between zero and one. 
10 DSW (2005) used  d  instead of   for depreciation. 9 
 





                   (3) 
 
where  ] /[
~
AL K k    denotes  the  effective  capital-labor  ratio  and     is  the 
constant capital-output elasticity.
11 DSW (2005) argued that the steady state 



















kss  and that a permanent change in military 
spending does not affect the long -run steady state growth rate. F inally, DSW 
(2005) derive an empirically operational equation via linearizing the FEG by 
the truncated Taylor series expansion method. This equation is the business-as-
usual convergence equation derived by forward integration. We believe that 
DSW (2005) model needs a number of improvements, including the way they 
introduce  military  spending  into  the  augmented  Solow  model,  and  also  in 
regard to some derivations and results. Firstly, military expenditure is defined 
as  “manna from  heaven” in  the model. In a general  equilibrium model, all 
spending must be financed by some source.
12 According to DSW (2005), there 
is  some  military  expenditure,  ) ( ) ( ) ( t Y t m t M   ,  but  the  source  of  this 
expenditure has not been specified. This modeling approach does not fit the 
idea of general equilibrium. It could have been financed e.g., by taxation, by 
channeling (exogenous) savings ￠ la MRW (1992), or by assuming it to be an 
externality  in  the  form  of  a  technological  spillover.  Unfortunately,  none  of 
these  is  undertaken  or  assumed  in  DSW  (2005).  Since  it  was  defined  as 
expenditure in the model economy, the way it is financed should have been 
explicitly shown.  In this  respect,  the model  is  ‘unclosed’; the way military 
expenditure is defined in the model is nothing but an assumption, produced 
without rationale or legitimization. 
 
Secondly, DSW (2005) made the following interpretation immediately after 
their specification of aggregate production function and technology (equations 
(1) and (2)): 
 
“according to this specification, a permanent change in  ) (t m  does not affect 
the long-run steady state growth rate, but has potentially a permanent level 
effect on per-capita income along the steady-state growth path and affects 
transitory growth rates along the path to the new steady-state equilibrium” 
(DSW, 2005, p. 457). 
 
                                                       
11 k
~
 in our model is equivalent to  e k  in DSW (2005).  
12  Solow is also a general equilibrium model with its own characteristics, cf. Acemoglu, 
(2008). 10 
 
We believe the statement that a permanent change in  ) (t m  does not affect the 
long-run steady state growth rate is a serious oversimplification. We can show 
this in several ways. One way to see it is via log differentiating the aggregate 
production function: 
 
   
  1 ) ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( t L t A t K t Y  
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Now imagine that the model is in the steady state. To make it absolutely clear 



















In  the  conventional  Solow  model  (that  there  is  no  ) (t m ),  physical  capital 
would grow at the rate of output, and hence the steady state growth rate would 






. However, in the differential equation above we cannot 
make such a statement, even if capital grows at the rate of output in the steady 





 in the 
steady state or not. Hence, military spending is not only effective on the growth 






We know from growth theory that share variables are expected to converge to a 
constant in the long-run. However, as DSW (2005) made no specification on 
the  behavior  of  military  spending  through  time, it  is  impossible  to  make  a 
particular statement on the steady state behavior of share of military spending 
to GDP. 
 
Third, there is a typo in DSW (2005) in the derivation of fundamental equation 
of growth expressed in per efficient capita. We can easily show this by starting 
from  aggregate  level  K Y s K         and  dividing  both  sides  of  it  by 
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The  critical  step  here  is  transformation  of 
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 . Given the assumptions made 












   , the differential equation turns out to be 
 





                   (4) 
 
where a hat on top of a variable is the growth rate of that variable. Clearly, the 
true definition of capital per efficient capita accumulation function is different 
from the way DSW (2005) define it (see equation (8) in DSW (2005)). One 
important implication of this inconsistency is that the convergence equation 
derived by DSW (2005) cannot be correct, as convergence equation takes into 
account transitional period and not steady state. 
 
Lastly, let us look at the steady state value of capital per efficiency labor. For 
this, we first need to prove how capital per efficiency labor behaves in the 
steady  state.  Suppose  now  that  the  system  is  in  steady  state.  In  this  case, 
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. Taking time 
derivative  of  both  sides,  we  obtain  
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.  We  know  from  the  literature 
that share variables do not grow in the steady state. In that respect, it must be 
true that    0 ˆ  ss m
dt
d
 (that is, the growth rate of share of military expenditure is 
constant  in  the  steady  state).  Hence,  the  steady  state  value  of  capital  per 
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k            (5) 
 
Equation (5) indicates clearly that the growth rate of military spending plays a 
role in the steady-state value of capital per efficient labor. Again, we obtain the 
result of DSW (2005) of equation (9) in their paper, only if  0 ˆ  ss m  (that is, 12 
 
growth rate of share of military expenditure is zero in the steady state, not an 
arbitrary constant). 
 
More than this, as capital per efficient labor is immeasurable; we need to go 
back to per capita value. Hence, recalling that  ] /[
~
AL K k  , per capita physical 
capital must be  k A k
~








ss m e A
m g n
s













        (6) 
 
What is problematic in (6) is that we have no idea on  ss m . In that respect,  ss k  
and hence  ss y  are indeed unknown. Furthermore, (6) implies that the steady 
state growth rate of capital per capita, and hence income per capita, is function 
of military share as well as exogenous technological growth rate: 
 
ss ss m g k ˆ ˆ                   (7) 
 
as long as  ss m  is not constant. Hence, the statement made by DSW (2005) that 
a permanent change in m does not affect the long-run steady state growth rate 
is an oversimplification, given initial assumptions. 
 
Finally,  assuming  that  the  technology  variable  ) (t A   evolves  according  to 
 )) ( ( ) ( 0 t m e A t A
gt     does indeed mean that military expenditure scales down 
and not up the variable, as  ) (t m  is a share parameter between zero and one. 
DSW  (2005),  on  the  other  hand,  have  the  following  comment  on  their 
definition of technology: 
 
“According to this specification, a permanent change in m does not affect the 
long-run steady-state growth rate, but has potentially a permanent level effect 
on per-capita income along the steady-state growth path and affects transitory 
growth  rates  along  the  path  to  the  new  steady-state  equilibrium”  (DSW, 
2005, p. 457). 
 
This  comment  does  not  clarify  whether  DSW  (2005)  perceived  rightly  the 
scaling-down nature of military expenditure on technology or not. We believe 





3  The Solovianized Romer Model 
 
As the Romer (1990) model is now widely known we will be as compact as 
possible  in  its  presentation.  Following  Romer  (1990),  we  assume  that  the 
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        1 0         (8) 
 
where Y  is final good (GDP),  Y H  is the number of human capital used in final 
good production,    1  is the respective production elasticity of that human 
capital,  i X   are  intermediate  goods  (varieties),  and  ) (t A   is  the  number  of 
intermediate goods at time t.
13 It should be noted that the form of (1) is Cobb-
Douglas,   
  e
Y X H Y
 
1 , for 














e X X ,  where 
e X   may  be  called 
efficient capital stock. We assume that human capital is allocated among three 
sectors: the final-good, R&D, and the defense, that is, 
 
H H Y Y   ,  H H D R D R   & &  , and  H H M M         (9) 
 
where  Y H   is  the  human  capital  employed  by  the  final-good,  D R H &   is  the 
human capital employed by the R&D sector,  M H  is number of human capital 
employed by the military sector;  Y  ,  D R&  , and  M   are the shares of human 
capital in the respective sector, and  H  is the stock of human capital, which is 
constant.  Note  that  1 &    M D R Y      at  all  times.  In  the  original  Romer 
model,  the  allocation  of  human  capital  between  competing  sectors  is 
endogenous.  Below,  considering  our  aim  of  deriving  an  empirically  usable 
convergence equation, we will assume that the tradeoff is exogenous to the 
model.




                                                       
13  We  purposefully  refrained  from  defining  unskilled  labor  as  the  third  argument  in  the 
production function, ￠ la Romer (1990), to keep derivations simple. As a drawback of this 
simplification, we will end up with a convergence equation in which some coefficients are 
unitary. Interested readers may refer to Annex B in BS&Y (2011) to observe that unit values of 
these  coefficients  should  not  be  taken  literally,  and  that  this  is  due  to  a  preference  for  a 
simplified model. 14 
 
Defense Sector 
We assume that the military sector is  run by the government  and  financed 
through proportional income taxation. At each time t, the government charges 
a constant tax on the output (=GDP) and uses this revenue to cover the costs of 
military  spending,  which  is  simply the  cost  of  human  capital  hired  in  that 
sector.  We  assume  that  the  government  follows a  balanced  budget,  which 
implies 
 
Y M H w M M M                  (10) 
 
In (10),  M w  is the wage cost of per unit skilled labor hired by the government 
in the defense sector, and  M   is the fixed proportional tax rate. Note that the 
alternative interpretation of  M   is the share of military spending in GDP, which 
corresponds to  ) (t m  in DSW (2005). Also note that we may express equation 
(10) as in intensive form, as  y w M M M      , where  y  is output per skilled 
labor. 
 
Final Good Sector 
We assume that there is perfect competition in the final-good sector and we 
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where  i x  are intermediate goods in per capita,  Y w  is the real wage rate for the 
skilled labor in final good sector, and  i p  is the user cost of intermediate-good 
i. The level of demand for each intermediate and human capital (employed at 
final-good production) follows directly from the first order profit maximization 
conditions: 
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       i        (12b) 
 
                                                                                                                                            
14 Interested readers may refer to Annex A in BS&Y (2012) to see how results change when 
labor allocation is endogenous in the original model. 15 
 
The above-given first-order profit maximization with respect to  Y H  and  i X  
are  inverse  demand  functions  for  human  capital  (employed  at  final-good 
production) and any individual intermediate i. 
 
Intermediate-good Sector 
We assume that the intermediate-good producing sectors only use ‘raw’ capital 
in order to produce an intermediate good:  i i X K   (or  i i x k   in per capita 
terms),  where  i K   measures  the  total  amount  of  raw  capital  going  into 
intermediate  good  of  type  i.  Raw  capital  can  be  rented  at  the  real  rate  of 
interest  r   plus  depreciation   :      r r .  Hence,  r  is  the  rental  rate  of 
capital. We assume that each intermediate-good producer has monopoly power 
right over the production and sale of the good  i X , as the patent (the blueprint) 
of the product belongs to it. Hence, the seller of the intermediate good faces a 
downward-sloping  demand  curve  (cf.,  equation  (12b)).  Therefore,  the  profit 
that the 
th i  monopolist has to maximize is    i i i i x r x p H        . The profit 





  , 
which  underlines  that  price  is  identical  across  intermediates.  Note  that 



















Y i , the quantity of each intermediate are identical 
across varieties. Identical prices and quantities across intermediates naturally 
imply  that  profits  are  identical  across  intermediates  as  well, 
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 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( .  Given  our  findings  that  price, 
quantity  and  profit  are  identical  across  intermediates,  it  must  be  true  that 
























. Using this information 
in (8) yields 
 
A x y Y   
   
1  or 
   
    
1 1 A k y Y         (13) 
 
Note from above derivations that    r x x   for a given  Y  . Below, we will show 







À  la  Romer  (1990),  we  will  define  the  knowledge  production  function  as 
A H A M D R      ) 1 ( &    .  We  argue  that  the  intensity  of  research  in  the 
defense sector positively augments the externality effect of the existing stock 
of knowledge. It should be noted that the defense sector presents a tradeoff 
from the viewpoint of the R&D sector. On the one hand, this sector augments 
the growth rate of knowledge. On the other, the higher the share of human 
capital in defense sector, the lower the human capital available for final good 
production  and  private  R&D.  Given  (9),  the  growth  rate  of  knowledge 
accumulation,  g H A M D R       ) 1 ( ˆ
&    ,  is  exogenous,  as  in  MRW 
(1992).
15 The difference is that we now know what its components are. 
 
Given the  assumption that  R&D sector  is perfectly competitive  and that the 
knowledge production function is known, the value of the i
th patent may easily 
be determined as 
) (
) (
) ( , & t r
t H
t V i D R
 
 , which is an arbitrage rule stating that the 
return out of investing an amount equal to the value of patent in the ‘financial 
market’ at time t,  ) ( ) ( , & t V t r i D R  , must be equal to profit  ) (t L    derived from 
that patent at time  t. The arbitrage rule is valid as long as per capita profit is 
constant. Recall that    Y r    ,  . Hence, as long as the real rate of interest  r  
is constant, which is true at steady state, the arbitrage condition would be as 
derived above. Finally, note that using the arbitrage rule in the first-order profit 
maximization  condition  in  R&D  sector,  D R D R w A V & &    ,  implies 









, where  D R w &  is the real wage rate in the R&D sector.  
 
Consumption-saving Tradeoff 
We  assume  that  the  consumption-saving  tradeoff  is  exogenous,  ￡  la  Solow 
(1956). This assumption allows a great simplification of Romer (1990), without 
losing  the  main  deriving  forces  of  the  role  of  technological  progress  on 
economic growth. We assume that capital accumulation is led by: 
 
K Y s K M         ) 1 (              (14) 
 
where  K  is capital,  s  is the exogenous saving (investment) rate, Y  is output 
and   is depreciation rate of capital.  
 
                                                       
15 A hat on top of a variable indicates the growth rate. 17 
 
Long-run Equilibrium 
Recall  that  knowledge  growth  rate  is  ) 1 ( ˆ
& M D R H A         .  Let  us  now 
determine the steady state value of unknowns of the model. To this end, first, 




) 1 ( ˆ ~ 1 1 g k s k Y M       
    
            (15) 
 








is well-known that capital per efficient capita does not grow at the steady state. 











































Y ss . 
 
Recall that, by construction,  ss k
~
 found above may be interpreted as the supply 
of capital per efficient capita in the model. We also need to define the demand 













which implies  x k 
~
.  Hence,  at  steady  state  (capital  accumulation  still  has 



































   
. Note that  ss r  responds negatively to an increase in saving rate 
and positively to the exogenous  growth  rate.  The rest  of the model can be 
solved through substitution. It is easy to show that the real rate of interest, the 
price  of  intermediate-good,  the  quantity  of  each  intermediate-good  and  the 
profit for each intermediate are all constant at the steady state. As a final note, 
g A k y ss ss    ˆ ˆ ˆ . We observe that the growth rate of GDP increases if (i) the 
productivity of R&D sector increases, (ii) the size or the share of human capital 
increases or the share of human capital allocated to defense decreases, (iii) the 
intensity of defense expenditure increases. GDP per efficient capita, on other 
hand, is positively associated with the exogenous saving rate and negatively 






2.1  Sources of International Differences in Income 





















Y ss . By taking  its natural log, and then making a few 






















] ln[ ln g s t g a y M Y ss  
                  (16) 
 
where     a A Ln )] 0 ( [  and  ) 1 ( & M D R H g         . Equation (16) may be 
used  for  studying  the  contribution  of  defense  sector  to  the  differences  in 
income per capita between economies in the long-run, ￡ la MRW (1992).
16 The 
main contribution of equation (16) is that it reveals the negative effects of the 
defense sector on the level of development in the long run. In particular, it 
shows the negative effects on long run development of income taxation for 
financing the defense sector and the allocation of skilled labor in the defense 
sector. In addition, the following may be considered as added value: (i) the 
model decomposes the exogenous growth rate into its components, (ii) human 
capital is incorporated into the model through a general equilibrium modeling 
approach, (iii) the three-sector structure of the model has obvious advantages 
over the one-sector Solow framework in terms of its flexibility, and therefore it 
has the potential for extending the framework for further research questions. 
 
No Spillover Effect  
Finally,  we  would  like  to  extend  the  above  analysis  to  a  certain  type  of 
economies that incur military expenditure without any spillover effect on the 
private R&D sector. In this group we can consider MENA countries, in which 
all taxation is used for supplying military personnel and purchasing arms and 
equipment.  In  this  particular  group  of  countries,  one  may  assume  that  no 
human capital is employed in the defense sector, that is,  1 &   D R Y    and that 
at each time t, the government charges a constant tax on the output (=GDP) to 
finance the salaries of military personnel (soldiers, etc) and other expenses: 
                                                       
16 Recall that in the standard Solow set-up, the steady state value of output per efficient capita 
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ln g s t g a yss ,  where     a A Ln )] 0 ( [ .  Note  that  the 
determinants of  g  and  ) 0 ( A  are undefined in that case. 19 
 
 
Y M L w M M                    (17) 
 
In  (17),  M w   is  the  wage  cost  of  per  unit  unskilled  labor  hired  by  the 
government in the defense sector and  L  is the stock of military personnel (no 
skills  but  military  skills).  If  we  resolve  the  whole  model  under  these 
assumptions,  we  find  again  (16),  but  with  the  following  modifications: 
H g D R    &    and  1 &   D R Y   . Again theory suggests that the intensity of 
defense spending has negative effects on long run economic growth. 
 
 
2.2  Convergence 
The defense sector and the components of technological progress may also be 
important in the transition to the steady state. In particular, it is interesting to 
determine  whether  the  intensity  of  defense  has  any  significant  role  in 
convergence of economies. As convergence derivations are well known, we 
will keep this part to a minimum. Recall that capital accumulation function is 
given  by  (15).  We  first  need  to  express  (15)  in  terms  of  y ~,  as  it  is  more 
convenient to work with GDP per effective capita for derivations. To this end, 
through using log differentiated production function, that is,  k y ˆ ~ ˆ ~    (recall 
that  y y y ~ / ~ ˆ ~    and  k k k
~
/
~ ˆ ~   ), and after simple arithmetic operations, we may 
re-express (7) in terms of  y ~: 
 
)) ~ ( ( ) ( ) 1 (
) ~ ( ) ~ (
1 1
y Ln g e s
dt
y dLn y Ln










      
 
  (18) 
 
The differential equation in ( 18) is not linear. Through log-linearization, we 
find that 
 
  ) ~ ( ) ~ ( ) )( 1 (
) ~ (
ss y Ln y Ln g
dt
y dLn
               (19) 
 20 
 
Let  us  now  define  ) )( 1 ( g       .  Hence,  the  speed  that  an  economy 
converges to its own steady state is     
) ~ (




17 The solution of the 
linearized differential equation in (19) yields 
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where      ) 0 ( 1 0 A Ln e t g
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t e
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t e  and  3 5     . The LHS of (20) is the growth rate of 
per capita income relative to initial level. Determinants of this change in level 
of  per  capita  take  place  on  the  RHS.  There  are  two  constants  in  0  :  total 
growth  rate  between  the  initial  time  and  ending  time,  t g  ,  and 
    ) 0 ( 1 A Ln e
t  
  .  1   is the coefficient of initial level of income per capita. 
Notably, this coefficient is negative, which is consistent with the convergence 
idea.  Coefficient  2    captures  the  contribution  of  human  capital  on 
convergence.  The  higher  the  share  of  human  capital  used  in  final  good 
production, the higher is the growth rate. Coefficients  3  ,  4   and  5   show the 
contribution  of  the  investment  rate,  the  intensity  of  defense  sector  and  the 
effective depreciation on convergence, respectively. Clearly, the very existence 
of defense sector results in a range of impacts that are greater than its direct 
effects. The defense sector affects convergence analysis through its effect on 
the rate of technological progress and on the share of human capital allocated 
to final good production. The equation also overcomes two drawbacks of the 
existing  convergence  literature,  cf.,  MRW  (1992).  First,  g   has  been 
decomposed into its components (see equation (12) in BS&Y (2012) for an 
application  of  the  convergence  equation).  Contrary  to the  practice  of many 
previous  studies,  it  is  theoretically  consistent  not  to  take  the  rate  of 
technological  progress  as  being  same  and  constant  across  economies.  The 
second  improvement  is  that  the  model  incorporates  human  capital  into  the 
model in a more elegant way in the convergence equation. Another potential 
                                                       
17  Just  to  understand  what  (19)  actually  implies,  suppose  that  ) ~ ( ) ~ ( ss y Ln y Ln  .  As 
) ~ ( ) ~ ( ss y Ln y Ln   is  negative,    ) ~ ( ) ~ ( ss y Ln y Ln      would  be  positive.  More  than  this,  the 
higher  the  difference  between  ) ~ (y Ln   and  ) ~ ( ss y Ln ,  the  higher  would  be 
  ) ~ ( ) ~ ( ss y Ln y Ln    . In this case, an economy further away from its steady state would have 
a higher growth rate. 21 
 
value  added  over  the  existing  literature  is  that,  by  using  the  competitive 
equilibrium  approach,  the  three-sector  nature  of  the  model  allows  further 
extensions in several directions. 
 
No Spillover Effect  
Let us re-examine the results of our convergence results under the no spillover 
assumption. Recall we had assumed that no human capital is employed in the 
defense  sector,  that  is,  1 &   D R Y   ,  and  that  the  government  charges  a 
constant tax on output to finance the salaries of unskilled labor (e.g., military 
personnel),  Y M L w M M      . In that case, again we find (20), but with the 
following  modifications:  H g D R    &     and  1 &   D R Y   .  Hence,  the 
intensity of defense spending does only have a negative effect on economic 
growth during the transitional period according to theory. 
 
 
4  Concluding Remarks 
 
We  still  lack  an  empirically  consistent  theoretical  framework,  in  the 
neoclassical sense, on the relationship between defense spending and economic 
growth. DSW (2005) was a historical breakthrough in that direction, although 
not without its own technical problems. In addition, the overall convergence 
literature based on MRW (1992) suffers from the nonrealistic assumption that 
all countries have an identical and unchanging rate of technological progress. 
Recently, BS&Y (2011) developed a theoretical framework that overcomes this 
unrealistic assumption. The current study introduced defense spending to the 
BS&Y  (2011)  model,  in  the  sense  of  DSW  (2005),  but  removed  the 
inconsistencies  of  DSW  (2005).  We  show  that  the  intensity  of  defense 
spending in GDP has both positive and negative effects in the long run and 
during the transitional period. In this respect, our theoretical model supports 
the findings of the empirical literature, which were inconclusive in nature. In 
the special case where the observations are made from LDCs, it is theoretically 
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